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Integrity in the fresh produce supply chain: solutions and approaches 1 
to an emerging issue.  2 
Manning, Louise. and Monaghan, James 3 
 4 
Food fraud is the misrepresentation of food in terms of labelling or documentation. 5 
The fresh produce supply chain is global with fresh produce grown many 6 
thousands of miles from the point of purchase and consumption.  Long supply and 7 
complex fresh produce supply chains provide opportunity for fraudulent activity 8 
to occur especially further processing or re-packing of products to mask opaque 9 
practice and non-compliant behaviour. Price premiums for products designated as 10 
‘high-value’, for example, organic produce, produce of particular provenance, or 11 
geographical production area provides motivation for less scrupulous actors to 12 
present for sale, produce that is mislabelled or misrepresented. People integrity as 13 
well as data, product and process integrity are gaining wider attention in the 14 
horticultural sector. Types of fraud critiqued in this review paper include 15 
mislabelling, substitution or misrepresentation of origin (country or regional 16 
location), method of production (organic or conventional) or incorrect varietal 17 
declaration. These challenges and the existing and emerging technologies that are 18 
both used within a quality assurance programme and alternatively used by 19 
regulators when investigating potential instances of fraudulent behaviour are 20 
considered. New methodological solutions and approaches are emerging and such 21 
techniques will develop rapidly to meet the growing challenge of fraud and to 22 
ensure consumer trust in the industry is maintained especially as types of food 23 
fraud evolve and become more sophisticated.  24 
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1. Introduction 28 
 Food fraud is the misrepresentation of food in terms of labelling or documentation 29 
i.e. the food is not what it is purported to be.  Fraudulent mis-description on food product 30 
labels is a widespread problem, particularly with high added-value products commanding 31 
a premium price (Woolfe and Primrose, 2004:222). Food fraud is ‘deliberately placing 32 
food on the market, for financial gain, with the intention of deceiving the consumer’ 33 
(Elliott Review, 2013). Food fraud can lead to food safety issues, but in the food industry 34 
food fraud is increasingly seen as a different challenge to food safety problems. This 35 
means that in order to reduce the likelihood of occurrence and also to reduce the impact 36 
should an incident occur countering the risk of food fraud requires both similar and 37 
alternative methods to those that are currently used to address food safety risk.  38 
The types of fraud critiqued in this review paper include mislabelling, substitution 39 
or misrepresentation of origin (country or regional location), method of production 40 
(organic or conventional) or incorrect varietal declaration. The aim of this work is to 41 
consider the challenges and the existing and emerging technologies that are both used 42 
within a quality assurance programme and alternatively used by regulators when 43 
investigating potential instances of fraud.  Fresh produce sold in the European Union 44 
(EU) is of particular interest here because of the need for market compliance with EU ten 45 
specific marketing standards for ten types of fresh producec where criteria such as class 46 
(quality attribute), variety and country of origin  must be truthfully ascribed (Gov.uk, 47 
2019). Thus, there is a clear financial motivation for perpetrators of fraud to substitute 48 
alternative products with different varietal attributes or geographic origin where existing 49 
quality control methods would find it difficult to identify that such substitution has taken 50 
place. In the years 2016-18 there were fifty-nine notification for fruit and vegetables for 51 
“adulteration/fraud” within the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) Database 52 
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linked to problems such as illegal importing, absence of health certificate(s), Common 53 
Entry Documents (CED) and certified analysis reports and improper health certificates 54 
that were signed before the analysis was performed (Source: RASFF, nd). Examples of 55 
non-compliant products included dried figs from Turkey; frozen okra, curry leaves and 56 
red chilli from India; raisins from Iran and Turkey; dried beans and watermelon seeds 57 
from Nigeria; fenugreek from Ethiopia, dragon fruit from Vietnam, and peppers from 58 
Egypt. 59 
Global supply chains are becoming more sophisticated and complex, and together 60 
with the potential for weak governance, this means that the low probability of discovery 61 
or the low severity of punishment or sanctions provides an incentive for perpetrators to 62 
commit food fraud (Sarpong, 2014; Pustjens et al. 2016). However, food fraud may also 63 
be motivated as a mechanism to appear to meet stated customer (retailer or food service) 64 
requirements e.g. substituting ingredients to meet supply chain constraints and barriers 65 
(Kowalska et al. 2018). The constraints and barriers identified in the literature that drive 66 
this mendacious behaviour include, first, regulatory or political pressures, and then supply 67 
chain pressures. These supply chain pressures include: economic, competitive or coercive 68 
dynamics; information asymmetry with associated power concentration with specific 69 
actors; data swamping, opacity i.e. a lack of visibility; or organisations being time poor 70 
and looking for quick solutions to deliver value in the supply chain (Manning, 2016; 71 
Manning et al. 2017). Indeed, reasons for mislabelling of fresh produce whether 72 
intentional or unintentional might be due simply to human error, a lack of verification 73 
during product labelling changes in production system or even an error in original artwork 74 
design (Kowalska et al. 2018). Changes in the fresh produce supply chain that increase 75 
vulnerability and risk include:  globalisation, especially where horticultural production 76 
takes place in countries with lower regulatory standards and governance; more 77 
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prescriptive food safety management standards; the impacts of climate change on supply 78 
and demand dynamics; and transitions in food culture and consumer behaviour (Kleter 79 
and Marvin, 2009; Jacxsens et al. 2010; Marvin et al. 2016) Further factors that influence 80 
fresh produce chains have been synthesized (Table 1). 81 
Take in Table 1 82 
It is arguable that, to date, fresh produce food safety has had a higher profile than 83 
fraudulent activity. There has been more focus on the direct risk to consumer health of 84 
inadequate production practices being linked to foodborne illness outbreaks (FIOs).  85 
These FIOs can be large, with fresh produce accounting for 10% of FIOs in the European 86 
Union from 2007 to 2011, 26% of individual illness cases, 35% of hospitalisations, and 87 
46% of deaths (EFSA, 2013). In response, production standards have been developed that 88 
follow the principles of hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) systems and 89 
apply a systems-based approach to managing food safety (Gil et al. 2015; Monaghan et 90 
al. 2017). Growers are required by many customers to adhere to a quality assurance 91 
scheme (QAS), either an industrywide QAS such as Red Tractor Assurance (RTA, 2017) 92 
or a customer-specific QAS such as McDonald’s good agricultural practices (GAP) 93 
guidelines (McDonald’s Corp., 2012).  However, these systems rely heavily on a 94 
formalised system to show that actions are being completed and as a result there is a 95 
difference between developing and developed countries in the efficacy of food safety   96 
control systems employed (Faour-Klingbeil and Todd, 2018) 97 
Food integrity has been defined as ensuring that food which is offered for sale is 98 
not only safe and of the nature, substance and quality expected by the purchaser, but also 99 
considers other aspects of food production, such as the way it has been sourced, procured 100 
and distributed and being honest about those elements to consumers (Elliott, 2014). Thus, 101 
developing supply chain systems and standards that assure food integrity will enhance 102 
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food safety, authenticity, quality, and increase consumer trust in product claims (Kleboth 103 
et al. 2016; Goddard et al. 2018).  Integrity in the horticulture supply chain is driven by 104 
consumers who demand that the produce they purchase is firstly, what it purports to be 105 
(product integrity); secondly is produced in line with defined standards (process 106 
integrity); thirdly that these standards address ethical corporate behaviour (people 107 
integrity); and finally the data associated with the produce (data integrity) is valid and 108 
reflects the intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of the product (Manning, 2016; 109 
Manning, 2018). Thus developing product integrity and traceability protocols can 110 
underpin product integrity, trust and an open and transparent supply network (Soon et al. 111 
2019).  112 
The differentiation of fresh produce as previously described at the production and 113 
retail level provides opportunity for certain types of food fraud such as economically 114 
motivated substitution or mislabelling to occur. Economically motivated substitution 115 
could also happen when produce from one country of origin is substituted for another 116 
product from a different source especially if the produce is visually similar and there is a 117 
large price differential between the produce from the claimed source and the source being 118 
substituted. Further, the additional value derived in differentiating between 119 
conventionally grown products and organic production means that there is an 120 
economically motivated opportunity to substitute conventional for organic produce and 121 
label this as organic. Examples of reported cases of mislabelling and misrepresentation 122 
have been collated to show the types of fraud that can occur (Table 2). 123 
Take in Table 2 124 
Product identity from source through to processing/packing and distribution has 125 
been aligned with notions of traceability (Bertolini et al. 2006); a so-called ‘chain of 126 
custody’ (Thakur and Hurburgh, 2009). Indeed identity preservation is becoming an 127 
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increasingly important credence or process attribute that adds economic value to a product 128 
(Dabbene et al. 2014). Regulation EC/178/2002 defines traceability as the ability to trace 129 
and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or substance intended to be, or expected 130 
to be incorporated into a food or feed, through all stages of production, processing and 131 
distribution. In high information input and complex supply chains such as fresh produce, 132 
the market requirements for identity preservation and traceability often need to exceed 133 
the legislative requirements for ‘one step back-one step forward’ processes (Manning, 134 
2017). Thus, an effective traceability system should establish and enable the identification 135 
of product lots and their relation to batches of raw materials, processing and delivery 136 
records (BS EN ISO 22000:2005). 137 
Industry mechanisms to ensure that identity preserved products are what they are 138 
purport to be include the use of business to business (B2B) or business to consumer (B2C) 139 
supply chain standards. B2C standards through associated cues on packaging such as 140 
organic certification logos, geographic indication [British flag or country of origin 141 
designation], method of production [Red Tractor] and the associated traceability and mass 142 
balance checks i.e. extrinsic product characteristics, need to be verified in order to ensure 143 
consumer trust (Manning and Soon, 2014). Whilst some of these transactional tools are 144 
private mechanisms, legislative standards in the European Union (EU) also underpin the 145 
use of the term ‘organic’ or provenance designated geographic origin (EU Protected Food 146 
Name Scheme via the requirements of Regulation EU No 1151/2012).  147 
This review paper considers specifically food fraud in the fresh produce supply 148 
chain and the existing and emerging product and process verification activities that take 149 
place. The British Retail Consortium (BRC, 2018) Global Food Standard describes 150 
verification as the application of methods, procedures, tests and other evaluations, in 151 
addition to monitoring, to determine whether a control or measure is or has been operating 152 
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as intended. Process verification is the assessment of objective evidence that relates to 153 
process integrity such as the assessment of documentation, product and process 154 
certification and traceability data rather than product testing. However, process 155 
verification, such as third party certification (TPC) relies upon the ability to assess valid, 156 
authentic, objective and representative evidence (Manning and Soon, 2014). Product 157 
verification involves the analysis and testing technologies used both within a quality 158 
assurance programme and by regulators when investigating potential instances of 159 
fraudulent behaviour.    160 
2. Process verification: the role of auditing 161 
An audit is the systematic, independent and documented process undertaken to obtain 162 
and then evaluate valid, representative, objective evidence (records, statements of fact or 163 
other information) to determine whether the evidence demonstrates that audit criteria 164 
(policies, procedures and requirements) and standards have been fulfilled (BS EN ISO 165 
9001: 2015). Therefore, auditing is an effective form of verification when it identifies 166 
both conformity and any deviations from standards, legislation or regulation whilst 167 
trading this outcome against using the minimum amount of resources to achieve the audit 168 
objectives (Kleboth et al, 2016). In a transactional way, the industry often sees audits as 169 
being of value when they are quick yet accurate, sometimes referred to as a snapshot, 170 
independent, objective, unbiased, transparent, reliable, scalable and as a result promote 171 
consensus building (Albersmeier et al. 2009; Salama et al. 2009; Powell et al. 2013). 172 
However, TPC audits, a key element of process verification activities in the supply chain, 173 
are a market interaction and there is a risk that this economic framing could impact on 174 
independence and validity (Martinez et al. 2013; Verbruggen and Havinga, 2015). The 175 
Elliott Review (2013) noted that the quality and completeness of TPC audits was variable 176 
and that there is a danger that an audit regime can be used for raising revenue, placing 177 
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unnecessary costs on food businesses. TPC audits alone will not deliver effective 178 
verification of integrity in the food supply chain and they need to be undertaken in co-179 
ordination with other activities such as product testing. 180 
One challenge to the efficacy of TPC and even first party or second party audits as a 181 
form of verification is the degree of data integrity. Data integrity, quite simply, is the 182 
quality of data i.e. the degree of accuracy, consistency or validity of data held by an 183 
organisation or multiple organisations in the food supply chain. This data is either hard 184 
form (paper based) or digital form contained on computers, networks and clouds. Whilst 185 
the increased ability to store information might improve timeliness for process and 186 
product verification, conversely the volume of data being held can lead to data swamping 187 
for supply chain organisations, regulators and certification bodies undertaking third party 188 
verification (Manning et al. 2017; Manning and Wareing, 2018).  Data swamping arises 189 
as a result of the sheer volume of data being collected and stored, the inefficient control 190 
or storage of data either as a result of strategic weakness or because of the cost of 191 
implementing digital solutions, or simply a misunderstanding of the timeline for data to 192 
be collected and then shared with others. There is no current literature on the challenge 193 
of data swamping or indeed the effective management of data in the food literature 194 
suggesting this is an area for future empirical research. In this context, data management 195 
can be considered as the actions taken, and governance implemented, to ensure data 196 
integrity when an organisation acquires, validates, stores and shares data.  197 
One technological solution put forward to address data integrity and data management 198 
is the use of distributed ledger technology, with one option being Blockchain. The 199 
proposed advantages of this type of technology are reduced cost and increased speed of 200 
transactions in the supply chain, more effective incident identification and 201 
responsiveness, and the ability to overcome information asymmetry especially for 202 
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consumers and as a result improving inter-actor trust and transparency (Manning and 203 
Wareing, 2018). The disadvantages are the need for strong governance of systems to 204 
prevent cyber-security breaches. The nature and type of cyber threats is increasing and 205 
shifting rapidly in line with the use of digital data technology and the risk of infiltration 206 
of digital networks (Khursheed et al. 2016).  207 
Hollands et al. (2018) consider the benefits and challenges associated with 208 
Blockchain and argue that traceability systems are already a core strategic process within 209 
many food company management systems that control products and manage supply chain 210 
data especially through enterprise resource planning (ERP) platforms. However they 211 
counter ERP systems are expensive to implement and Blockchain technology may 212 
provide the opportunity to link “blocks of information” associated with distinct 213 
transactions that can form a tracking and tracing system. The IBM platform “Food Trust” 214 
has been used to trace mangoes to source in seconds superseding the one step forward 215 
one step back systems mentioned earlier in this paper. However Bateman and Cottrill 216 
(2017) suggest that there are challenges to the use of Blockchains, distributed ledgers, 217 
especially if the data is of poor quality that is entered into the system especially where 218 
the data them becomes immutable. They further argue that not all members of the supply 219 
chain have digital access especially smallholders in developing countries so this can mean 220 
that some data is still recorded manually before later being entered into a system. There 221 
is still a risk too of fraudulent behaviour where incorrect data is intentionally entered into 222 
the system.Thus, data integrity and associated management and security protocols need 223 
to be more actively developed and verified in fresh produce supply chains to reduce the 224 
potential for both intentional and unintentional mislabelling incidents. 225 
3. Product verification: testing technologies 226 
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An alternative approach to audits for establishing product attributes is to test the 227 
produce for its innate integrity.  When determining an appropriate testing technology the 228 
first consideration is whether the technology is using a targeted or a non-targeted method. 229 
Targeted methods are seeking to identify the presence or alternatively absence of specific 230 
markers that can demonstrate i.e. authenticate the identity of a given food or identify the 231 
presence of a given chemical or contaminant. Non-targeted methods are used as a wider 232 
screening mechanism for food. Ballin and Laursen (2018) in a review of analytical 233 
approaches for food authentication have proposed definitions and nomenclature for 234 
targeted and non-targeted approaches.  Targeted analysis focusses on one or more pre-235 
defined analytical target(s) e.g. a specific pesticide residue.  Non-targeted analysis, 236 
simultaneously detects numerous unspecified targets or data points (often>100) and is 237 
often qualitative e.g. ‘fingerprinting’ or metabolomics (Ballin and Laursen, 2018). 238 
Difficulties in developing authenticity methodology include finding appropriate markers 239 
that characterise an element of the food that is consistent and can be measured accurately 240 
and having authentic samples that can assist methodology development in the first place 241 
(Primrose et al. 2010). Chemical methods to determine authenticity include primary 242 
metabolites such as sugar, amino acid and/or organic acid profiles of certain fruits (Bat et 243 
al. 2018). However, they argue secondary metabolites are influenced by geographic origin 244 
and production methods. Proving fraud has taken place requires detailed detection 245 
techniques (Woolfe and Primrose. 2004) and studies deploying DNA markers to identify 246 
mislabelling of plant-derived products are limited (Scarano et al. 2015). Fresh produce 247 
can be characterised using ‘classical techniques’ such as the use of isotope ratio mass 248 
spectrometry. Increasingly, new technologies are superseding and complementing these 249 
techniques. The majority of these constitute the so-called ‘omic’ technologies where high 250 
throughput analyses are combined with chemometrics and bioinformatics 251 
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The key authentication issue in fresh produce, as previously described, is that of 252 
origin i.e. is the correct variety named; is the geographic origin of the crop correctly 253 
identified; have unapproved/illegal pesticides been applied; is the crop ‘wild harvested’; 254 
is the crop ‘organic’; (Esslinger et al. 2014).  Different approaches are considered here 255 
that address these issues and provide data where authenticity, identity or provenance and 256 
regulatory compliance can be determined. 257 
3.1 Variety testing  258 
 DNA analysis techniques have developed to identify species or variety include 259 
detection of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), simple sequence length 260 
polymorphisms (SSLPs), restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs), and the 261 
use of real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and heteroduplex analysis (Woolfe and 262 
Primrose, 2004; Primrose et al. 2010). Identification techniques based on PCR 263 
amplification followed by simple sequence repeats (SSR) analysis and principal 264 
coordinate analysis (PCA) can identify genetic differences in varieties of tomatoes 265 
especially in processed products where morphological markers may be lost (Scarano et 266 
al. 2015). SSR techniques have also been used for variety identification, genetic 267 
fingerprinting, genetic diversity analysis and parentage verification in Prunus species, but 268 
specifically sweet cherry (Liu et al. 2018). However, the level of DNA may not reflect 269 
accurately the amount of material originally substituted or added especially if processing 270 
has degraded the DNA or there are multiple copies of a given gene sequence in a cell 271 
(Primrose et al. 2010). 272 
 273 
3.2 Geographic origin  274 
 Consumers are willing to pay a premium for local food (Feldmann and Hamm, 275 
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2015), but the geographic origin of produce can be difficult to quantify.  Isotope 276 
abundances can vary with the geographic location, and if samples of the soil or water are 277 
available from geographical regions, it may be possible to identify material grown in that 278 
area.  For example, it was possible to discriminate between peppers of different 279 
geographical origin by correlating the δ18O of water in the peppers with a database of 280 
isotope ratios for water (Flores et al. 2013). Another approach is to use elemental 281 
fingerprinting (Danezis et al. 2016) where the profile of groups of macro elements, trace 282 
elements, rare earth elements and ultra-trace elements can be used as an indicator of 283 
geographical origin as the profiles are linked to the geology of the production area 284 
(Danezis et al., 2016). Perini et al. (2018) conclude from their studies on soft fruit that 285 
the δ13C and δ15N value of pulp and the δ18O of juice can be used to differentiate 286 
geographical origin and verify declared provenance. In addition, microbial populations 287 
may differ between geographical locations and El Sheika et al. (2009) analysed the yeast 288 
community structures on the surface of Physalis and successfully discriminated between 289 
geographical production areas.   290 
3.3 Misrepresented use of pesticides 291 
Fresh produce monitoring programmes by retailers and enforcement agencies 292 
target residue testing towards levels of specific compounds either the active ingredient or 293 
the associated breakdown products.  Multi-residue analysis methods commonly use gas 294 
or liquid chromatography coupled with mass spectrometry (GC/LC-MS) (Stachniuk, 295 
2018).  Residue testing has two uses: it can establish whether label recommendations have 296 
been followed i.e. Good Agricultural Practice (GAP); and whether residues are present 297 
of non-approved or illegal pesticides.  However, the approach has limitations as residues 298 
decline over time and early application of non-approved compounds may mean residues 299 
are undetected at reportable levels. 300 
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3.4 Misrepresented use of synthetic fertiliser 301 
 It is possible to detect the accumulation of synthetic N fertiliser in plant tissues by 302 
looking at stable isotope ratios in the produce in a targeted approach.  Crops grown 303 
organically have δ15N values of +0.3 to +14.6%, while crops grown with synthetic N 304 
fertiliser range from negative to positive values, i.e. −4.0 to +8.7% (Inácio et al. 2015).  305 
However, a number of studies have highlighted the weaknesses in this approach where 306 
the organic and conventional values can overlap e.g. Schmidt et al. (2005) reported that 307 
lettuce, onions, cabbage and Chinese cabbage from field production had δ15N-values in 308 
the range of +5 to+6 for conventional production and +5.5 to+7.5 ‰ for organic 309 
production.  In addition, the application of a small amount of manure or the use of water 310 
with a large concentration of nitrate can result in an increase of the δ15N values, close to 311 
those obtained in organic production (Laursen et al. 2014). On its own, δ15N data can only 312 
provide supporting evidence in suspected fraud cases, but not for discriminating between 313 
both production systems (Bueno et al. 2018).  314 
3.5 Substitution of conventionally grown produce as organic. 315 
 Studies have suggested using multiple isotopes of nitrate derived N and O 316 
(Laursen et al. 2013; Mihailova et al. 2014).  Approaches based on the measurement of 317 
multiple biomarkers and/or complex chemical or physical profiles/fingerprints supported 318 
by multivariate statistical analysis show more potential (Capuano et al. 2013).  Bueno et 319 
al. (2018) demonstrated that a combined chemo-metric analysis of high-resolution 320 
accurate mass spectrometry (HRAMS) and δ15N data was able to discriminate 321 
successfully between organic and conventionally grown tomatoes.  Multivariate analysis, 322 
combining isotope data with mineral content (Yuan et al. 2018), and mineral content and 323 
key metabolites (Flores et al. 2013) have been able to classify organic and conventional 324 
brassica, peppers and lettuce.  325 
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Studies have found that organic methods of vegetable production have increased 326 
concentration of total glucosinolates and benzylglucosinolate which can be used to 327 
differentiate methods of cultivation (Rossetto et al. 2013); and major and trace element 328 
profiling has been used to determine whether onions and peas were conventionally or 329 
organically grown (Gundersen et al. 2000). Bioactive components such as phenolic and 330 
hydrophilic antioxidant capacity were identified as markers for being able to determine 331 
organic and conventional tomato juices (Vallverdú-Queralt et al. 2012).  332 
Trace element and nitrogen isotope data is of value in differentiating conventional 333 
and organic tomatoes but less effective with lettuce indicating a concern over analytical 334 
testing being used in isolation as a single determinant of provenance (Kelly and Bateman, 335 
2010). Picchi et al. (2012) urged caution that phytochemical content as a marker for 336 
considering a crop’s response to growing methods, in this case cauliflower, was affected 337 
by genotype i.e. some genotypes showed improved phytochemical content under organic 338 
production and others particularly with regard to glucosinolates and ascorbic acid did not. 339 
Conventional and organic production influence the external microbial populations 340 
and internal metabolite production.  There is a significant focus on the use of 341 
metabolomics (metabolite fingerprinting) to discriminate between production systems 342 
using both targeted and non-targeted approaches (Cubero-Leon, 2014; Medina et al. 343 
2019).  Bigot et al. 2015 analysed the yeast and bacterial community profiles on the 344 
surface of nectarines and peaches using PCR-DGGE to differ between organic and 345 
conventionally produced crops.  Llano et al. (2018) demonstrated that an untargeted 346 
metabolomics approach was able to identify metabolites (biomarkers) that could 347 
discriminate between organic and conventional goldenberry fruit. 348 
4. Conclusion 349 
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One of the challenges of additional supply chain risk assessment processes and 350 
verification steps is that this can add quality cost to the supply chain but it is a preventative 351 
cost that will offset the costs of a recall. Risk assessment processes for food fraud include 352 
the use of threat analysis critical control point (TACCP) and vulnerability analysis critical 353 
control point (VACCP). However, only known and assessable threats can be prioritised 354 
(using a semi-quantitative assessment of likelihood and severity) to then develop a control 355 
measure(s) (countermeasure) and then a subjective scoring system to identify CCPs. Then 356 
effective fraud risk management, monitoring and verification systems can be developed. 357 
However the binary aspect of known/unknown threats means that decision-makers may 358 
then identify a subsequent incident that could lead to a major food recall as simply being 359 
“unforeseeable” (Manning, in press). 360 
Since the Elliott Review, the notion of food integrity has been developing not just in 361 
terms of the product itself, but also the processes employed, the behaviour of individuals 362 
and the validity of data that is being used (Manning, 2016). This growing interest in 363 
integrity has led to the emergence of new techniques to confirm origin, variety and 364 
method of production e.g. organic or conventional. Indeed, metabolomics is enabling 365 
metabolite fingerprinting which is showing the potential to discriminate between a range 366 
of production factors. Further studies will require large numbers of samples to be taken, 367 
analysed and the results included in reference databases.  These will need to encompass 368 
a wide range of sources of variation for the target biomarkers i.e. different agronomic 369 
conditions, vegetable varieties and geographical locations (Bueno et al. 2018). Non-370 
targeted metabolomics utilized in metabolite fingerprinting can generate very large 371 
datasets, requiring bioinformatics analysis and increasingly machine learning (Medina et 372 
al. 2019).  These developments are of value in determining the potential for mislabelling 373 
and mis-description, and effective verification protocols combining product and process 374 
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verification need to be developed and effectively implemented in order to maintain 375 
consumer trust in the fresh produce industry. 376 
 377 
  378 
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  681 
Table 1. Factors that influence fresh produce supply chains (Adapted from 682 
Ahumada and Villabos, 2009; Shukla and Jharkharia, 2013). 683 
 684 
Strategic Tactical Operational 
Financial planning 
 
Demand forecasting 
accuracy and modelling 
 
Capacity (warehouse and 
production facilities) 
 
Supply network design 
Technology 
 
Demand-price elasticity 
Harvest planning 
 
Crop choice 
 
 
Crop scheduling 
 
 
Logistics and 
transportation 
 
Inventory 
management  
 
Labour selection 
 
 
 
Production scheduling activities 
 
Harvesting 
 
 
Storage 
 
 
Transportation (vehicle routing) 
 
 
Weather conditions 
 
 
Plant maturation rates 
 
Product shelf-life/rate of 
deterioration 
 685 
  686 
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Table 2. Examples of fresh produce mislabelling and misrepresentation 687 
Case Details 
Case 1 Vidalia spring onions (Georgia United States) have a premium price 
compared to product from other US states. 1986 saw state legislation to 
delignate a specific production area. Additional quality control systems 
were put in place. Incidences of rebagging occurred. Between 2001 and 
2003 there were six fines ranging from $5,000 to $29,000 for misuse of 
Vidalia label. A further case fine was $100,000. (Carter et al. 2006) 
Case 2 The “San Marzano” tomato is one of the most important processing tomato 
varieties in the world. The tomato has a designated origin but is often 
substituted with other plum tomatoes from both Italy and outside Italy 
leading to deception of consumers (Scarano et al. 2015).  
Case 3 The labelling of Greek produce as Cypriot when there was oversupply of 
Greek product due to the Russian embargo in 2014 (Joyce, 2014) 
Case 4 A Canadian company AMCO Produce was fined $210,000 in 2018 by the 
Canadian Food Insepction Agency (CFIA) because between 2012 and 
2014, the company was said to have intentionally mislabelled produce, 
including tomatoes and cucumbers, as being from Canada when the 
country of origin was in fact Mexico. The products were sold to Sobeys 
Inc. and other retailers. The CFIA undertook a random inspection and 
found products labelled as Ontario produce when in February the 
temperatures were too low in the region for greenhouse production (Karst, 
2018).  
Case 5 Australian Supermarkets Coles and Woolworths were fined in 2011 when 
two stores were identified as selling mislabelled fruit – one for not 
declaring the country of origin and the other store for selling lemons 
origination from the USA as “Product of Australia” (Eckersley, 2011). 
 688 
 689 
